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5 
The Global Green Economy: Competition or 
Cooperation between Europe and China? 
Hubert Schmitz and Rasmus Lema 
5.1. Introduction 
Three major waves of change have occurred in the global economy in recent decades. First, 
there was the reduction of barriers to flows of goods, finance and information. The second 
involved a shift of economic power from West to East. Third, but only just beginning, is a 
restructuring towards a greener global economy due to the threat of climate chaos.  
China was the main beneficiary of the first wave.  Through a process of integration into 
global value chains, China was able to build up its production capabilities very quickly. This 
laid the basis for the second wave, the emergence of China as a driver of global change, altering 
the parameters for competing in the global economy. China has transformed the global map of 
manufacturing industry. Over a short period it has acquired production capabilities challenging 
the old industrial powers and forcing them to switch to other stages of the value chain or to 
other sectors. The green sectors were originally thought be immune from this. During the 2000s 
Europe expected that its renewable energy industries would retain global pre-eminence and 
become a bastion of green growth and jobs. Now we know that China is also transforming these 
green industries.  
This chapter examines this challenge from China for Europe’s green industry - showing both 
intense competition and close cooperation. It shows how and why these relationships vary 
between green sectors and different stages of the value chain. This is the core of the chapter. We 
then show how the global financial crisis influenced the Chinese challenge for Europe and 
reflect on how the new division of labour affects the chances of mitigating climate chaos. The 
chapter thus traces some of the inter-connections between two of the challenges discussed in 
this book: the economic challenge and climate change.  
Concentrating on how China challenges Europe in the global green economy might seem a 
surprising choice given that China has gained a reputation for damaging its own and the 
world’s environment. Indeed, over more than three decades of resource-intensive growth and 
reliance on coal-fired power plants, Chinese CO2-intensity is among the highest in the world 
(Ecofys, 2014; see also chapter 1 in this volume). However, having become the world’s greatest 
source of carbon dioxide emissions in the first decade of this millennium, China has now 
become the world’s largest investor in renewable energy and other green sectors (BNEF, 2013). 
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China is thus becoming a major player in the global green economy with domestic firms rapidly 
catching up with the world leaders. 
The ramifications for European industry vary a great deal, in particular in renewable energy. 
In hydropower, China has now become the world’s leading exporter of dams for electricity 
generations. Starting with building up its capabilities by supplying the home market, lead firms 
such as Sino Hydro have become multinational enterprises. While they operate globally, they 
mainly compete with European firms in the developing world (Huang and Fang, 2013). In the 
solar photovoltaic industry, the local Chinese market only became important more recently. 
This industry started out as an export-oriented industry and by ‘learning from exporting’, 
Chinese producers have moved from supplying components to complete solar panels in a short 
time-span. By the late 2000s they undercut European (and American) producers, leading to 
major job losses and prompting a trade war (Fischer, 2012; Luetkenhorst and Pegels, 2014).  
This painful solar experience has affected not just the European competitors in this sector but 
the discussion on green growth more generally. As noted by Geels (2013, p. 83).  
The green growth discourse in Western countries is hindered by cheap Chinese competition, 
which caused over-capacity, tumbling prices, and bankruptcy or job reductions for many 
Western wind and solar companies. The industrial shake-out and job losses led politicians to 
criticize the use of Western government subsidies (for renewable energy) to stimulate Chinese 
industries.  
This chapter sheds light on the assumptions made in the discourse referred to by Geels.  It 
does so by examining the interconnection between China and Europe in the wind power 
industry. It shows that the changing relationships have to be seen in the context of the global 
financial crisis. We cannot isolate a ‘China effect’ because the increasing competitive pressure 
from China coincides with the global financial crisis.  
The European wind power turbine industry was working at full throttle when the financial 
crisis broke out in 2008. Most manufacturers and component suppliers were working at 
maximum capacity. Due to long lead times, the effects of the crisis were initially not felt fully, 
being mitigated to some extent by financial stimulus packages. But 2008 was nevertheless a 
turning point where overcapacity caused prices to fall. Starting that year, prices fell by more 
than 20 per cent over the next three years (Gosens and Lu, 2014, p. 310). Today, in 2014, the 
European industry is just beginning to rebound from falling prices, major job losses and 
dwindling profits.1 
It is clear that the global financial crisis and the scaling back of national government support 
has had an adverse effect on the European wind power industry (Luetkenhorst and Pegels, 2014; 
Sørensen and Springborg, 2010). It is less clear how the rise of China as a major wind power 
nation has affected the European wind power industry and what the prospects are for 
                                                          
1 Tens of thousands of European jobs were lost in the wind power industry during the economic 
downturn. Denmark has the highest proportion of wind power jobs in Europe. During 2009 when the crisis 
gathered speed, the Danish wind power industry lost 4,000 industrial jobs out of a total of approximately 
28,000 in just one year. Subcontractors accounted for more than 3,000 of those jobs (Sørensen and 
Springborg, 2010). 
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competition versus cooperation between European and Chinese firms. This is the question on 
which we focus in this chapter.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides essential background information on 
China’s wind power market and its drivers. Section 3 analyses the growing competition among 
the international wind turbine producers in recent years, highlighting the rapid advance of 
Chinese firms in the global top ten and the parameters on which they compete with European 
firms. While the competition between European and Chinese lead firms is strong, there are also 
many examples of cooperation. In order to explain this, section 4 sets out the value chain of 
wind turbine production and innovation. This provides the analytical basis for unravelling 
surprising forms of cooperation between Chinese and European firms. This cooperation is 
driven by the pressure on Chinese firms to catch up and improve the quality of their products 
and the pressure on European firms to gain access to the large and rapidly expanding Chinese 
market. Reflecting on these findings, section 5 asks wider questions about China’s role in 
Europe’s crises, stressing the need to differentiate carefully between and within sectors.   
Section 6 discusses economic and political ways forward and Section 7 sets out questions for 
further research.  
5.2. China and the green economy 
The purpose of this section is to provide some background on the build-up of China’s green 
economy. China now boasts the world's largest renewable energy system, generating over 1 
trillion kWh (in 2013) from water, wind and sun (Mathews and Tan, 2014). After decades of 
rapid and ‘dirty’ economic progress, China has begun to set targets devised to reduce the 
carbon intensity of growth, in particular by investing in renewables.  
 
The forces of change 
 
The rationale for investing in low-carbon restructuring differed from European countries, at 
least initially. While the first push in Europe three to four decades ago was spurred by a 
growing environmental movement, China’s initial turn to green technologies was mainly 
rooted in industrial development and energy security interests rather than in environmental 
considerations (Schmitz, 2015). The main concerns were reducing dependence on imported 
energy, building competitive industries, and (at the local level) creating jobs and raising public 
revenue (Dai, 2014). 
Recent years, however, have seen a growing dissatisfaction with the environmental 
degradation and smog in the rapidly growing Chinese urban areas. Chinese policy makers are 
struggling with how to combine high economic growth – still demanded by those left behind in 
the Chinese take-off – with reducing pollution and carbon dioxide emissions, let alone an 
absolute decline in the use of fossil fuels (cf. Clark and Hornby, 2014). One part of the solution – 
the consequences of which are now being felt in many parts of the world – is the fostering of the 
renewable energy industries. 
The financial crisis proved to be an important turning point because financial stimuli 
packages were dedicated to boosting green industries. In 2008 as well as in 2009 the financial 
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stimuli packages in China were more ambitious than any other nation when it comes to 
investments earmarked for green industries (Morrison and Yoshida, 2009). China allocated 5.3 
per cent of GDP to these sectors of the economy through green stimulus packages. Countries in 
the EU also identified investment in renewable energy as a way to overcome the crisis, create 
jobs and develop new growth perspectives, but to a much smaller degree. For example, 
Germany, a forerunner in greening the economy, allocated roughly 0.5 per cent of GDP through 
the stimulus package in 2008 (Barbier, 2010). In China the green stimulus strategy proved to be 
an inflection point in the growth path which became visible over the coming years. 
 
The significance of China in renewable 
 
Mathews and Tan (2014) suggest that the year 2013 marked a significant change in the 
country’s energy trajectory because the scales tipped towards electricity generated from 
renewables compared to coal and nuclear. In 2013, renewables accounted for 60 per cent of new 
electricity generation capacity of which 11 GW was solar and 16 GW wind turbines (Clark and 
Hornby, 2014; GWEC, 2014). This high share of added capacity from renewables in electricity 
generation is higher in China than in most other countries in the world. Although this is still far 
from the expansion required to meet targets set by climate scientists, Mathews and Tan (2014) 
assert that carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector in China can be expected to fall 
soon.2 
In 2013 the Chinese wind power market was still growing at an annual rate of more than 20 
per cent, and China ranked number one globally in terms of cumulative installed capacity with 
91.4 GW, or 29 per cent of global capacity (GWEC, 2014; WWEA, 2014). The number one 
position was achieved at breakneck speed. In 2005, when the domestic industry took off, 
China’s wind power capacity was 1.25 gigawatt (GW), accounting for only 2 per cent of the 
world market. Between 2005 and 2013, total installed capacity in China thus increased by more 
than 70 per cent per year. Approximately five years after the ‘take-off’ in the home market, the 
Chinese export of wind-power equipment had its own take-off in 2011. From a low average of 
18MW/year during the period 2008-2010, exports rose rapidly to a level of 692 MW installed 
capacity in 2013. However, only a very small share of these exports went to Europe, whereas the 
majority of turbines were exported to emerging markets (Lema et al., 2013, pp. 52-54). 
This rapid expansion of wind power capacity in China is mainly a result of favourable 
government policies. These policies have contributed to rapidly growing internal markets for 
renewable energy. As in Europe, large subsidies are involved, since the cost of generating 
electricity from wind and sun is still higher in most Chinese locations than that of fossil-fuel 
based energy.  
                                                          
2 The current high share of coal in the energy mix, combined with rapid economic growth in heavy 
industries, has put China in the position of being the biggest CO2 emitter globally (IEA 2014). However, a 
large share of China’s emissions is due to exports - approximately 23 per cent of Chinese emissions are due 
to China’s insertion into global value chains catering for the European and North American markets 
(Watson and Wang, 2007). 
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China’s rise as a wind turbine producer is thus closely related to the size and growth of its wind 
energy market and the policies that support it. The global demand for wind energy is shifting to 
the East. European countries and the US have long been the dominant markets in the global 
wind power sector but by 2010 more than half of newly installed wind power capacity was 
added outside these traditional markets. China has been the main driver of this development. 
Within just half a decade or so, China has managed to build the largest market for wind power 
in the world. This is the home market from which Chinese firms are now taking off and 
competing internationally.  
5.3. Competition  
The world keeps observing China’s economic rise with a mixture of admiration and trepidation: 
admiration because the speed and depth of the country’s economic transformation are 
unprecedented in history; trepidation because China has increased the competitive pressure on 
industry in many countries and sectors. There is now a substantial literature on the impact of 
China’s industrial transformation in creating both considerable threats but also new 
opportunities for industry in other countries (Eichengreen, 2006; Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008; 
Jenkins and Barbosa, 2012; Fujita, 2013). This chapter seeks to show how this balance of threats 
and opportunities has been unfolding in the European wind turbine industry. Section 3 
discusses the increasing competition between Europe and China while Section 4 examines the 
opportunities for cooperation.  
 
The rise of Chinese lead firms 
 
The rotating blades of wind turbines have become an iconic symbol of the green economy. 
Until recently, Europe was the global leader in producing and using such wind turbines. This 
European leadership rested largely on the green investments of two countries, Denmark and 
Germany. Most of our discussion of Europe refers to these two countries. Denmark was the 
pioneer in producing and using wind power, but Germany caught up rapidly. Today, both 
countries remain global leaders in innovation but China has become number one in the 
production of wind turbines. China is also catching up in developing new wind power 
technology (Lewis, 2013). Unpacking and understanding this overall picture is essential for the 
central argument of this chapter concerning the co-existence of competition and cooperation.  
Competition is intense and most visible when we concentrate on the lead firms of the wind 
power industry. Table 1 gives some idea of the competitive pressure on Europe and the speed 
of China’s advance. It shows the top ten turbine manufacturers in the world. While in 2005, 
seven of the top ten firms were European and none were Chinese, by 2010 there were four 
Chinese firms in the top ten.  By 2013 this number had reduced to three but four of the 
following five wind turbine manufacturers just below the top were also Chinese (NAW 2014).  
Europe remained strong with five in the top ten by 2013 but clearly less strong than in 2005 
(Table 1). The big loser has been General Electric, whose market share declined from 17.7 per 
cent in 2005 to less than five per cent in 2013.  
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Table 5.1. Top ten global wind turbine manufacturers 2005 - 2013 
2005 2010 2013 
Company Share Origin Company Share Origin Company Share Origin 
1. Vestas 27.90% EU 1. Vestas 14.8% EU 1. Vestas 13.2% EU 
2.General 
Electric 17.70% US 2. Sinovel 11.1% CN 
2. 
Goldwind 10.3% CN 
3. Enercon 13.20% EU 
3. General 
Electric 9.6% US 
3. 
Enercon 10.1% EU 
4. Gamesa 12.90% EU 
4. 
Goldwind 9.5% CN 
4. 
Siemens 8.0% EU 
5. Suzlon 6.10% IN 5. Enercon 7.2% EU 5. Suzlon 6.3% IN 
6. Siemens 5.50% EU 6. Suzlon 6.9% IN 
6. General 
Electric 4.9% US 
7. Repower 3.10% EU 
7. 
Dongfang 
Electric 6.7% CN 7. Gamesa 4.6% EU 
8. Nordex 2.60% EU 8. Gamesa 6.6% EU 
8. United 
Power 3.9% CN 
9. Ecotécnia 2.10% EU 
9. Siemens 
WP 5.9% EU 
9. 
Mingyang 3.7% CN 
10. Mitsubishi 2.00% JP 
10. United 
power 4.2% CN 
10. 
Nordex 3.4% EU 
Others 5.00%  Others 17.5%  Others 31.6%  
Note:  World market shares 
Source: BTM (2006, 2011, and 2014) 
 
The lead firms compete head-on, in particular for the major contracts - equipping the new 
wind farms. The market is differentiated according to different types and sizes of turbines 
(customized for different wind speeds, temperatures and onshore/offshore installation). Overall, 
however, Europe has the edge with regard to product differentiation, large scale and off-shore 
turbines, and reliability, and China with respect to price and medium and small scale on-shore 
turbines. 
  
The sources of economic power  
 
In order to understand the competitive dynamics, it helps to observe how China was able to 
increase its share of the global market. Here one can distinguish four sources of competitiveness 
which need to be distinguished individually but which also significantly reinforce each other.3 
The first is the strength of the home market. The Chinese government – understandably concerned 
with energy security – has fostered the production of renewable energy. The Renewable Energy 
Law of 2005 was the central piece of legislation. Along with other complementary policies, it 
                                                          
3 In this chapter we do not deal with a fifth source  coordination power, one which derives from highly 
modular supply chains in China (Lema et al., 2013). 
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helped to create a rapidly expanding internal market for wind power. Foreign enterprises were 
not prevented from competing in this market but Chinese enterprises were favoured, receiving 
Government support through various means, some visible (e.g. local content requirements in 
place during 2005-2009), others less visible (e.g. bidding for state-funded projects). Since the 
Chinese market was large and fast growing, success in this market had a major impact on the 
global market shares, which are summarized in Table 1.  
The second source of Chinese competitiveness is producer power. The large size and rapid 
growth of the Chinese market enabled Chinese turbine manufacturers to adopt a model of 
industrial organization geared towards economies of scale. A turbine is a complex product 
typically consisting of over 10,000 parts. While leading European firms - such as Vestas of 
Denmark and particularly Enercon of Germany - produced many of these parts in-house 
(seeking to constantly improve design and quality), their Chinese counterparts relied much 
more on buying components from suppliers who also supplied other turbine makers and were 
thus able to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs. 
The third source of competitiveness is financing power. This is as yet little explored in the 
literature but is of increasing importance. The essential point is that Chinese firms can offer 
supplier credit but this is much more difficult for Western firms. This matters greatly for their 
customers since investment requirements for wind farms are high and time-frames are long. 
Project finance may become particularly important for competing in export markets. Compared 
with their Western counterparts, Chinese companies have deep financial pockets.  Sinovel, for 
example, has a 6.5 billion US dollar line of credit from government-owned banks (Zeller and 
Bradsher, 2010). China Exim Bank has injected capital into Goldwind and Ming Yang to support 
foreign expansion. Such support opens up the possibility of an export model that has not been 
directly utilized by European firms – the twinning of wind farm project finance and turbine 
exports. Many new projects undertaken abroad by Chinese turbine firms have been 
implemented with tag-along finance. The finance effect is beginning to show. ‘Competition 
from Chinese manufacturers has dragged down prices for wind turbines, while Europe’s 
economic slowdown has tightened credit markets, curbing funds for project development’ 
(BNEF, 2012a).  
A potential fourth source of competitiveness is innovation power. There is controversy over 
how real this is. Some argue that the Chinese firms rely largely on technologies licensed from 
European firms. This view is supported by patent statistics which reveal that China occupied an 
insignificant position in wind energy patenting well into the first decade of this millennium 
(McDowall et al., 2013). Others argue that Chinese firms have moved on and started to 
accumulate significant innovation capabilities. Since the locus of innovation power is essential 
for the future of Europe’s industry, the next section delves deeper into this issue, unpacking the 
parts of the value chain concerned with innovation. This then enables us to gain new insights 
into the nature of the relationships between European and Chinese firms. 
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Figure 5.1. The Wind Power Value Chain 
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The head-on competition between Europe and China which we have stressed so far – and 
which dominates the discourse in the media and business press – occurs between the lead firms 
in turbine manufacturing. A different picture emerges, however, if we shift our focus to 
different stages of the value chain, namely turbine design, component design and deployment 
(Figure 1). The next section examines these different parts of the value chain.  
 
5.4. Cooperation  
Value chain analysis offers a valuable analytical tool for understanding how the global map 
of industrial production has changed (Gereffi, 1999). It has proved particularly valuable for 
understanding the speed with which newcomers come to compete in the global economy 
(Schmitz, 2006) and how different ways of organizing the global value chain affect the ability to 
compete (Sturgeon, 2002).The innovation part of the value chain, however, has remained 
relatively underexplored.  
This is beginning to be addressed in new work on the organizational decomposition of the 
innovation process - ODIP (Schmitz and Strambach, 2009). The essence of value chain analysis, 
namely slicing the value-adding process into separate activities, was extended to the innovation 
process. The starting point for this line of investigation was the fundamental change in the way 
innovation is organized. Innovation activities that used to be carried out in-house are now often 
transferred to independent suppliers of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) or 
suppliers of key components. This helps with understanding the changing global innovation 
map. Using such ODIP analysis, we have shown shifts in innovation power to Brazil and India, 
as evidenced in the auto and software industries (Lema et al., 2012). Analysing the 
organizational decomposition of the innovation process is essential for understanding the issue 
that is central to this paper – the relationships between European and Chinese firms in the wind 
power industry.  
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Cooperation in licensing and co-design relationships 
 
European wind turbine makers rely more on their internal capabilities than their Chinese 
counterparts, but even they cannot do everything in-house. As noted earlier, a wind turbine is a 
very complex product, with some parts requiring highly specialized expertise. A good part of 
this expertise resides in knowledge-intensive business services. These KIBS firms do not have a 
manufacturing capacity but instead adopt a business model focused on selling R&D and 
consultancy services and licences for wind turbine design. To give some examples, Windtec of 
Austria was among the first to sell licences in the market, becoming a technology supplier to 
Germany’s Fuhrländer and other European firms. Norwin of Denmark focused on turbine 
design and entered into an agreement with the German firm Preussac, which then 
manufactured turbines based on the resulting licence agreement. Some of these KIBS emerged 
out of the earlier consolidation and restructuring of the European wind power industry. For 
example, Norwin was founded by three engineers from the R&D department of Danwind, a 
wind turbine firm which went out of business in 1991. Such KIBS play an important role with 
regard to wind power innovation in Europe. They are also important for the build-up of 
production and innovation capability in China.  
When China entered the wind power industry, it had no turbine technology of its own. It 
relied almost entirely on licensing technology from Western firms. Such licences were acquired 
not from the lead firms but from smaller turbine makers and in particular from wind KIBS 
(Lewis, 2013, pp. 136-37). These KIBS have developed a revenue stream based on licence fees 
from their customers abroad, in particular in China. The Chinese manufacturers used these 
licences to build up their own production capabilities. All this is relatively well known. What is 
less well known is that some of the Chinese manufacturers have also now begun to build up 
their own innovation capabilities. This is being done through various learning channels. One of 
the most important channels is the relationship with the European KIBS: what was originally a 
licensing relationship has often become a co-design relationship. Turbines or components are 
designed jointly between a Chinese manufacturer and a European design house. The Chinese 
side gains access to top European engineers and the European side gains (indirect) access to the 
Chinese market. 
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Figure 5.2. Links between European KIBS and Chinese manufacturers 
 
 
The underlying shift in technology relationships is captured by Lewis (2013) in her 
observations on one of the China’s lead firms: ‘Goldwind, like many other wind companies, 
began its entry into the wind industry by acquiring a technology licence from a foreign 
company. At it became more experienced, it sought out a German design firm to work with 
rather than a manufacturer that could also be a competitor.’ (ibid., p. 133). This case is not an 
exception as shown in Figure 2 which depicts the relationships between 26 Chinese turbine 
makers and 18 (mainly) European KIBS. While not claiming to be comprehensive, the figure 
indicates that such relationships are now fairly common. Some are mainly about licensing, 
others about co-design, while some include both. It is not yet clear how durable the 
arrangements of cooperation in design are, but clearly the inter-firm relationships between 
China and Europe are changing over time, helping China to break through from production to 
innovation.4  
While the globalization of the innovation process has contributed to this process, it was also 
supported by favourable domestic factors, notably public policies (Section 2 of this chapter; 
Cunningham, 2014), investments in the local innovation systems (Gosens and Lu, 2013), 
investments in firm-level learning (Qiu and Anadon, 2012) and other factors typically 
emphasized in the catch-up literature (Lee, 2005; Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). 
 
 
                                                          
4 The shift from licensing to co-design has also received increasing attention from Chinese scholars, 
notably Qiu and Anadon (2012), Ru et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2012), Zhou et al. (2012) and Dai et al. (2014).  
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Cooperation across value chain functions 
 
In addition to the collaborative relationships between European turbine designers and 
Chinese turbine manufacturers, many other instances of co-operation along the value chain can 
be observed. For example, European component designers and component manufacturers are 
working with Chinese firms. While European turbine manufacturers generally face a tough 
time in China, certain suppliers of key components are working for, rather than competing with, 
Chinese firms. Control systems software is one of the areas in which European firms have a 
competitive edge and Chinese firms are seeking to learn from them. For example, the Danish 
firm Mita-Teknik works with Sinovel on control system software. Sinovel and Mita-Teknik had 
originally entered into an agreement under which Sinovel purchased controls systems and 
software from Mita-Teknik, but under a new agreement the two companies will develop the 
next generation of control systems jointly (Lema, 2012).  
European firms are also helping China to develop its offshore wind power base. Siemens was 
responsible for the Jiangsu Rudong Offshore farms, which were connected to the grid in May 
2012. Besides developing the wind farm, Siemens also entered into a joint venture with 
Shanghai Electric, which was established to focus on offshore projects. Such projects bring 
European expertise to the demanding offshore segment of the wind power industry, which is 
still relatively underdeveloped in China. On the other hand, China has capabilities for 
producing at low cost. Some European utilities are pondering how to use turbine foundations 
produced in China to bring down the costs of offshore projects. 
The transformation of China–Europe relationships does not stop here. Lead firms from both 
sides have become global firms rather than remaining purely European or purely Chinese firms. 
Vestas has established a sizeable R&D laboratory in China and Goldwind has acquired majority 
control of the German wind turbine maker, Vensys. Titan Wind Energy acquired a tower 
factory for Vestas of Denmark, thus rescuing jobs that would otherwise have been lost due to 
the major restructuring process undertaken by Vestas that was triggered by the 
financial-economic crisis. Merely contrasting European and Chinese industry risks missing out 
the transformation of relationships between them that is underway.  
To sum up, Section 3 of this chapter revealed fierce competition between European and 
Chinese lead firms of the wind power industry. However, this Section 4 showed that this fierce 
competition co-exists with cooperation between Chinese and European firms. The relationships 
of cooperation become apparent once we closely examine the value chain, in particular the 
innovation part. Unpacking the innovation process and identifying changes over time are 
essential for bringing to light the evolving pattern of inter-firm cooperation across the 
Europe-China divide.  
5.5. China’s rise - Europe’s crisis?  
 
The picture which dominates the media is that China’s rise has contributed to Europe’s crisis.  
Careful research shows that the China effect varies between countries and sectors (Venables and 
Yueh, 2006; Jacques, 2012).  Nevertheless, competitive pressures have increased for most 
industrial enterprises, including those operating in the green economy.     
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The reconfiguration of competition and cooperation, as described above, has important 
ramifications both from a European economic crisis perspective and from a sustainability 
perspective. As shown in this chapter, the assertion that cheap Chinese competition is the root 
cause of over-capacity, unemployment and falling share prices in the wind power industry in 
Europe is an exaggeration. In wind power, the competition from China on European soil is still 
very limited (Lema et al., 2013, pp. 52-53). The mitigating effects include high-transportation 
costs, the inability (of Chinese lead firms) to meet European quality standards and certain 
tendencies to favour national firms in major public projects (Lema et al., 2011).5  
Overcapacity in Europe arose first and foremost from austerity policies which scaled back 
government support for wind power and led to the cancellation of major projects. For example, 
Spain completely removed its feed-in tariffs for renewable energy projects in 2012 while many 
countries reduced their tariffs (REN21, 2012). The offshore sector was also affected. Banks 
lowered their offshore project funds (Wieczorek et al. 2013: 3015) and governments 
implemented cancelations and delays. For example, in 2014 Denmark put the 600MW Kriegers 
Flak, the world’s first project to supply three countries (Denmark, Sweden and Germany), on 
hold (Jensen 2014). 
  
Figure 5.3. Annual wind power installation in EU and China 2005 – 2010 (MW) 
 
                                                          
5 Many countries have implemented formal local content requirements (Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2013). 
As Fitch-Roy (2013, p. 51) puts it: ‘Ministers of trade are adopting a pragmatic attitude to local content rules 
that reflects the trade-offs faced by an intrinsically political business’. In Europe ‘protectionist’ tendencies 
are more hidden within tendering decision-making processes but arguably account for the fact that 
domestic or nationally incorporated firms dominate the markets in countries such as Denmark, Germany 
and Spain. 
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Figure 5.3 shows how the market contracted in Europe (and continued growing in China) 
when the global financial crisis hit in 2008. It was this contracting which affected the industry 
adversely. Wind was not alone; the entire renewable energy sector was hit severely. At the time, 
the consequences were assessed as follows:  
The investment surge of recent years was just starting to ease the supply-chain bottlenecks 
when the credit crunch arrived and cut demand. The result has been a dramatic and permanent 
change to the dynamics of the industry. On the supply side prices are falling towards marginal 
costs, and several players will consolidate. On the demand side renewable energy targets will 
still drive utilities to build projects, but fewer developers and independent power producers 
will be involved (Fritz-Morgenthal, 2009, p. 1). 
The picture which thus emerges is that, while China is driving the changes in the wind power 
industry, it would be misleading to see it as the main cause of the crisis in this industry.   
China’s rise coincided with the global financial-economic crisis, but Chinese competition was 
not a major cause of job losses and dwindling share prices in Europe. Subsidies for wind energy 
in Europe accrue almost exclusively to European firms as Chinese firms are yet to make a major 
foray into the European market. However, the European firms are aware that this might change, 
since they compete with Chinese firms in third markets and know their cost advantages. They 
are also forewarned by the rapidly changing fortunes of the European (and American) solar 
power industries.  
Indeed, it is worth reflecting on our findings in a comparative way. The balance between 
competition and cooperation in Europe-China relationships differs between green industries, 
notably between wind and solar photovoltaic industries. A brief comparison helps to see the 
need for such a differentiated analysis. 
As shown in this chapter, China’s entry into the wind energy industry is reshaping the 
relationships between Europe and China in major ways. A big domestic market was critical for 
building China’s production capacity; this in turn put pressure on European incumbents and 
drove down costs.  
China has also caused major disruption and drove down costs in the solar panel industry, but 
the dynamics were different. Here Chinese firms managed to build up producer power by 
catering for the European market; initially the domestic market – and reducing green house gas 
emissions domestically – played less of a role. Figure 4 shows how solar PV production was 
driven by exports during industry ‘take off’. 
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Figure 5.4. Chinese sales of solar PV cells: exports and domestic market (megawatt) 
 
 
Exports enabled China to emerge as the new leader (replacing the EU) in producing solar PV 
equipment (Fischer, 2012). However, in contrast to the wind sector, in which Chinese 
manufacturers still produce predominantly for the Chinese market, the Chinese PV sector has 
emerged partly on the basis of policy support for solar-energy deployment schemes outside 
China, mainly in Europe. The development of China’s PV sector originated from the production 
of PV cells and modules. By focusing on these elements, enterprises concentrated on the steps in 
the PV value chain where they had competitive advantages due to low labour costs, economies 
of scale and comparatively weak environmental standards applied to production processes. The 
development of the Chinese PV sector and exports to Europe has been facilitated by 
modularisation and comparatively low transportation costs.   
In China, government support for these activities was driven by local economic 
considerations and was similar to support given by local government to other export-oriented 
industries (Iizuka, 2014). Support schemes for the use and deployment of PV energy technology 
in China evolved in the context of the global financial crisis when export-oriented producers of 
PV cells and modules faced falling external orders, particularly in Germany. Hence, when the 
central government started to support PV energy use within China in 2009, the Chinese PV 
industry was already a highly capable producer and a fierce competitor in global markets. 
Figure 4 shows how domestic sales were increased dramatically when exports began to stagnate 
in 2011 and then fell from 2012 – thus compensating for decreasing external demand and 
ensuring overall growth in output.    
This was almost the complete opposite to the route taken in the wind turbine industry where 
the local Chinese market was the mainstay for domestic firms and where exporting came later. 
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The patterns of competition and collaboration therefore differed in important ways both during 
and after the financial crisis.  
In summary, the two green sectors are now highly globalized and Europe’s leadership is 
challenged in both. However, keeping in mind our focus on competition and cooperation with 
China, the value chains lens shows that the challenges take different forms in the two sectors. 
Hence there is also a need for differentiated responses when it comes to finding ways forward.  
5.6. Ways forward  
There is no shortage of contentious accounts of EU-China relationships in renewable energy. 
China is portrayed as causing the problems for the green industry and the climate. This chapter 
highlights the need to go beyond media headlines and simplistic rhetoric. Cutting through the 
complexities is essential for understanding the rapidly changing world.  
Currently, we observe that competition between the lead firms of the wind and solar PV 
industries is increasing rapidly, not least as a result of China’s increasing production and 
innovation power. From a green transformation perspective, this development is to be 
welcomed as it drives down the price of renewable-energy technology, supporting the 
reduction of greenhouse gases. Policy-makers in China and Europe, of course, are concerned 
about not only the global gains, but also the distribution of those gains among nations. 
In a rapidly globalizing renewable-energy sector, however, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to define the ‘national content’ of a wind turbine or a solar PV panel. Production and 
innovation in both sectors are increasingly globalized. This can be turned to mutual advantage. 
For example, the Chinese system of renewable-energy production is entering a new stage where 
it is increasingly important to improve the quality and reliability of technology. Hence, Chinese 
lead firms should seek to collaborate with European companies at various stages of the value 
chain to develop this expertise. In turn, Europe, in its current stage of getting back on its feet 
after a prolonged financial and economic crisis, is in need of more affordable renewable-energy 
technology. European lead firms, under pressure to reduce costs, may be able to cooperate with 
Chinese firms and access capabilities and resources for scaling up. 
The solar PV industry manufacturing industry was severely affected by Chinese competition 
and ‘rescue missions’ seeking to breathe life into European solar PV manufacturing are 
probably futile. Rather, policy makers should seek to support those elements of the value chain 
that are globally immobile. Distinguishing between the manufacturing chain and the 
deployment chain is critical. While it is true that European lead firms of the production value 
chain are losing market shares due to increased competition from Chinese lead firms, European 
installation, operation and maintenance companies in the downstream segment of the value 
chain are likely to benefit from the expansion of the market as a result of falling prices for solar 
PV equipment. Policies designed to support the solar deployment chain while drawing on 
Chinese manufacturing capabilities may contribute to job creation as well as green 
transformation. 
In wind energy, policy makers may seek to support collaborative relationships that benefit 
European industry, Chinese industry and the global climate. Chinese involvement in select 
value chain steps such as manufacturing of foundations for offshore deployment or the 
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provision of bearings may help to lower costs significantly. More ambitiously, cross-continental 
consortia may be formed between actors such as banks/institutional investors, utilities, 
manufacturers and operators for projects in Europe, China and the rest of the world. Pushing 
down costs and pushing up scales requires experimenting with different approaches.  
The China effect has certainly been painful for German and other affected producers in the 
solar PV industry. The question is whether a similar process may occur in wind power. From a 
European perspective, the gloomy observer might suggest that while the many relationships 
between European design houses and Chinese wind power producers may create or preserve 
jobs and profits in Europe, the industry needs to be viewed from a dynamic perspective. These 
design houses and their engagement in co-design relations may be undermining the 
competitiveness of European producers in the long run, with the consequence that the wind 
industry in Europe will follow a similar pattern to the solar photovoltaic industry. We do not 
think this likely. Due to the markedly different technological characteristics of solar PV and 
wind energy and the associated differences in industrial organisation, there will be a less 
dramatic China effect in the manufacturing part of the wind power value chain. It is more likely 
that regional production networks will be strengthened.  As with the automotive industry, 
‘regional’ European, Asian and American networks are likely to co-exist in which different lead 
firms dominate and compete globally while producing and sourcing mainly locally.  
Value chain analysis can be a powerful tool for designing intelligent policies for the support 
of European renewable energy sectors that are faced with global competition in different ways. 
The multiple challenges confronting Europe today  (climate change, reduced public finances 
and competitive pressures from Asia) call for highly selective and directed strategies to support 
markets and new collaborative business models.  
Developing and implementing such selective green industrial policy is not easy.  The 
technological, economic and political uncertainties are considerable (Schmitz et al., 2013).  In 
order to succeed, green industrial policy needs to focus on specific sub-sectors and adopt 
specific instruments aimed at developing and deploying specific technologies.  Predicting 
which technology to support for how long means making choices about allocating policy rents 
on the basis of highly incomplete information.  The uncertainties are exacerbated by the long 
time-horizons needed for new energy systems to become viable.  Yet, mitigating climate 
change requires action now.  Climate and earth scientists warn that delaying action means 
incurring rising costs and potentially irreversible damage.  
This combination of uncertainties makes green industrial policy particularly challenging.  
Elsewhere we have argued that the way forward lies in lies in putting politics centre stage and 
taking four critical steps. The first is to recognize that no single actor has the resources 
necessary to bring about the green transformation. The second is to recognize that within 
government, civil society and business there are actors seeking to block or slow down the green 
transformation. Third, attention needs to focus on supportive alliances across these categories. 
Fourth, including actors with different motives helps one to understand and accelerate the 
green transformation process (Schmitz, 2015).    
The last point is particularly critical for the concerns of this book. There are a range of actors 
that can support climate-relevant policies (e.g. by investing, providing expertise or lobbying) 
but their motive need not be mitigating climate change; the main motive might be to secure 
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energy, to build competitive green industries, or to foster green jobs – with climate change 
mitigation at best a ‘co-benefit’ (Dubash et al., 2013).   Acting upon this can be a ‘game 
changer’ and provide the basis for building transformative alliances.  The problem for 
European countries is that China’s rise makes it more difficult to build such alliances.  
Mobilizing political support for green policies in Germany, Denmark or other European 
countries is much harder if many of the resulting jobs are created in China.  So the question at 
the core of this chapter – competition or cooperation between Europe and China – has 
ramifications for the political dynamics behind green industrial policies.  
5.7. Questions for future research 
The insights provided in this chapter contribute to understanding a number of questions which 
are not the core focus here but are nevertheless critical for Europe and the rest of the world. We 
set out five questions that can provide a starting point for future research.  
First, the chapter indicates that business relations between Europe and China are 
characterized by co-operative competition in important areas of the value chain. The changes 
over time have implications for jobs, taxes, and long-run competitiveness. The changes have 
often been painful for European lead firms and their workers. For example, while collaborative 
relationships between KIBS providers in Europe and turbine manufacturers in China are 
mutually beneficial to the parties involved, such relationships may be against the interest of 
European industry as a whole because they may undermine long-run competiveness, jobs and 
taxable income. Future research needs to map out more precisely the strategic implications and 
the distribution of costs and benefits emerging out of those changing relationships. 
Second, there is world-wide concern that China’s economic rise has triggered a global ‘race to 
the bottom’. While the mobilization of China’s industrial reserve army has exerted a downward 
pressure on wages and prices in many industries, its firms are not stopping at competing by 
price cutting but are also now competing by innovating (Altenburg et al., 2008). The wind 
power industry analysed in this chapter shows that the country is undergoing this 
transformation in record time. New research is needed that gives specific attention to the time 
scale over which China is catching up in this technological area. The need to pay greater 
attention to the time-scales of building up innovation capability has been set out in detail by 
Bell (2006). This chapter suggests that such research focus on the combination of internal and 
external capabilities. Collaboration with external KIBS has provided a relatively fast route to 
catching up, but exactly how fast has it been and how deep do the Chinese innovation 
capabilities go? 
Third, there is world-wide concern that China’s rapid growth is polluting the planet and 
harming the climate. While China has indeed contributed more than any other nation to the 
recent increases in carbon dioxide emissions, it has also become the number one investor in 
renewable energy (BNEF, 2013). This paper suggests that these investments are being used 
productively to establish competitive green industries. Mathews (2012) even suggests that 
China may be on its way to developing a ’green model of industrial capitalism’. Examining the 
reality of this proposition requires research which compares the growth rates of investment in 
low versus high carbon industries and which compares the strength of alliances supporting low 
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versus high carbon industries. Such studies need to take into account the above mentioned 
insight that ‘green alliances’ are not necessarily driven by environmental concerns but also by 
concerns with energy security and competitiveness in green industries.  
Fourth, it is clear that global benefits are emerging because China’s entry into the wind power 
industry is lowering the costs of renewable energy technology. Whether the lower equipment 
costs will speed up the deployment of wind turbines in Europe and other parts of the world is, 
however, not yet clear. Other considerations influence the deployment of wind technology, in 
particular reliability and energy output. Life-time costs and actual electricity generation 
capacity are more important than upfront costs and nominal capacity. This depends on the 
demand preferences of different markets. The big unknown is the preference in new markets. A 
recent report suggests that future growth in the wind power industry will be driven more by 
new markets such as South Africa, Chile or Russia (MAKE, 2013). How effective will Chinese 
firms be in bringing down the cost of energy and opening up new markets? 
Fifth, China is building up its own innovation capabilities. The question is whether 
innovations coming out of China will differ substantially from innovations coming out of 
Europe and, if so, how and why. Are different specializations emerging that may give rise to a 
new division of labour? It would be particularly interesting to examine whether solutions from 
China are more affordable and appropriate for the poorer parts of the world, enabling a closer 
alignment of environmental and development objectives. Examining whether this is occurring 
entails looking beyond core technologies and examining the relevance of European versus 
Chinese business models for poorer parts of the world.  
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